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Introduction
The world’s climate is changing. Because of 
the growing importance of climate change 
to our broad security interests, the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) should consider the 
implications of climate change and should 
develop strategies to ensure it can contribute 
to any necessary response.
The 2009 Defence White Paper dismissed 
climate change as an issue for future 
generations, judging that the strategic 
consequences wouldn’t be felt before 
2030. But that’s no longer the case. The 
downstream implications of climate change 
are forcing Defence to become involved in 
mitigation and response tasks right now. 
Defence’s workload will increase, so we need 
a new approach.
Several concurrent climate change-related 
trends will present critical challenges to 
Defence both at home and in our near region. 
Those changes will include rising land surface 
temperatures, extreme events such as 
cyclones of greater intensity, more frequent 
floods, rising sea levels, heatwaves, changing 
drought and fire risk, and shifting disease 
patterns and threats to human health.
The recently released Australia in the Asian 
Century White Paper1 points to the challenges 
climate change will bring to the region, 
including the pressure it will bring to bear on 
regional growth and sustainability. The white 
paper foreshadows climate change threats to 
water, food and energy security, as well as a 
likely increased frequency of natural disasters. 
Adapting to climate change to ameliorate its 
impacts will bring additional costs to nations, 
businesses and communities.
The Gillard government’s new national 
security strategy points out that the more 
severe effects of climate change, particularly 
increases in the frequency and severity 
of extreme weather, compounded by 
competition over scarce natural resources, 
may contribute to instability and tension 
around the globe, especially in fragile 
states. It notes that Australia will work with 
like-minded regional middle powers to 
proactively manage the strategic implications 
of climate change.2
Climate change will exacerbate existing 
hardships and stresses in our neighbourhood, 
possibly risking the reaching of critical tipping 
points.3 The regional impacts of climate 
change that could indirectly affect Defence 
include possible population displacement 
due to the effects of climate and increased 
conflict over resources.
Changes in climate patterns and their impact 
on the physical environment, including in 
particular crop yields and food security, will 
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have impacts on countries in our area of 
strategic interest. Failure to anticipate these 
changes and understand their cascading 
security implications could increase the threat 
of states failing.
The extent of disruption as a result of 
climate change will be determined by the 
interaction of climatic events with existing 
environmental, socioeconomic and political 
conditions and vulnerabilities, as well as the 
level at which mitigation and adaptation 
measures are introduced.4
Defence should view climate change as a 
change in its operating environment. Just 
as the ADF changes in response to shifts 
in economic conditions, technology and 
demographics, it needs to adapt in response 
to changes in the physical battlespace. 
Rapidly changing environmental conditions 
will also affect the way our armed forces will 
be sustained and the ways they’ll operate. 
Emerging conditions will have implications 
for how we manage the Defence estate 
and associated military infrastructure. The 
value of Defence’s coastal infrastructure 
and vulnerabilities to climate change 
effects will have implications for defence 
budget planning.
The ADF will face increasing political pressure 
to contribute not only to responses to climate 
change disasters, but also to climate change 
mitigation. Clean energy specifications may 
increasingly become part of the capability 
acquisition process.
Although there’s been some work on 
infrastructure risks, climate change has 
generated little interest in either the ADF or 
the Australian Defence Department.5 This is 
in contrast to the UK: its Ministry of Defence 
has developed a climate change strategy and 
operational delivery plan that outlines how 
the British military will meet a fully legislated 
carbon budget. The UK military has appointed 
a star-ranked climate change and energy 
security envoy. The United States Navy (USN) 
has established a similar position.
One very positive development in the 
Australian context was the November 
2012 workshop convened by the Joint 
Capability Co-ordination Division of the 
Department of Defence on ‘Defence, 
national security, global change and energy 
sustainability: opportunities and innovations’. 
The workshop brought leading climate 
scientists together with defence planners to 
examine climate risks and their impact on 
operational capability.
This report provides an overview of the 
observable impacts of climate change, with 
special attention to Australia and our areas of 
strategic interest.
In this context, the report examines in broad 
terms how the ADF and the Department 
of Defence should adapt to and manage 
the consequences of a range of climate 
change-related issues.6 It places special 
emphasis on the need to provide credible 
information on climate change to Defence 
decision-makers. It suggests that the 2013 
Defence White Paper is the right vehicle for 
signalling policy changes.
However, it’s important to recognise that 
Defence won’t be the lead agency on 
climate change. Its role in climate security 
is to provide tools and approaches, and 
collaborate with other agencies, so that 
climate change doesn’t emerge as a 
primary military concern. The organisation’s 
actions should be part of a comprehensive 
whole-of-Australian-Government 
approach and should be coordinated with 
our international efforts to respond to 
climate change.
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Global trends
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are 
increasing and are very likely to continue 
to increase over the next few decades at 
least.7 On current GHG emissions trends, 
global average temperatures are projected 
to rise by between 2.4°C and 6.4°C by 2100 
‘on a business as usual’ GHG scenario. 
In general terms, the greatest warming 
will be in the northern latitudes and over 
continents (Figure 1).
Extratropical storms are projected to 
shift towards the poles, and this will bring 
about changes in wind, precipitation and 
temperature patterns. Globally, it’s very likely 
that there’ll be an increase in hot extremes, 
heatwaves and it’s likely that there’ll be an 
increase in heavy precipitation and tropical 
cyclone intensity. Precipitation is projected 
to generally increase in high latitudes and 
decrease in subtropical regions.
Our near region
The 4th assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)8 projected the following climate change 
impacts for Australia and adjacent regions:
 • Australia and New Zealand
 – By 2030, water security problems are 
projected to intensify in southern and 
eastern Australia and in New Zealand’s 
Northland and some eastern regions.
 – By 2030, production from agriculture 
and forestry is projected to decline 
over much of southern and eastern 
Australia and over parts of eastern 
New Zealand due to increased drought 
and fire.
 – By 2050, ongoing coastal development 
and population growth in some areas 
of Australia and New Zealand are 
projected to exacerbate risks from 
sea-level rise and increases in the 
severity and frequency of storms and 
coastal flooding.
Figure 1:  Projected global surface temperature changes, 2090–99
Note: Map shows the average of a large number of climate model temperature projections assuming a mid-range 
scenario for future greenhouse gas emissions (A1B). Temperatures are relative to the period 1980–1999. 
Source: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Figure SPM.6. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.
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 • Asia
 – Warming in South Asia is likely to 
be greater than the global average, 
and it’s likely that more frequent and 
longer heatwaves will occur.
 – By the 2050s, freshwater availability 
in Central, South, East and Southeast 
Asia, particularly in large river basins, is 
projected to decrease.
 – Coastal areas, especially heavily 
populated megadelta regions in 
South, East and Southeast Asia, will 
be at greatest risk due to more severe 
flooding from sea-level rise and storm 
surge and, in some megadeltas, more 
severe flooding from the rivers.
 – Saltwater intrusion from increased 
storm surges will affect water supplies 
and agriculture in coastal regions.
 – Climate change is projected 
to compound the pressures 
on natural resources and the 
environment associated with rapid 
urbanisation, industrialisation and 
economic development.
 – Endemic morbidity and mortality 
due to diarrhoeal disease primarily 
associated with floods and droughts 
are expected to rise in East, South and 
Southeast Asia because of projected 
changes in the hydrological cycle.
 • Small islands
 – Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate 
inundation, storm surge, erosion and 
other coastal hazards, thus threatening 
vital infrastructure, settlements and 
facilities that support the livelihood of 
island communities, including tourism 
and fishing.
 – Deterioration in coastal conditions, for 
example through erosion of beaches 
and coral bleaching, is expected to 
affect local resources.
 – By mid-century, climate change is 
expected to reduce water resources in 
many small islands to the point where 
supply becomes insufficient to meet 
demand during low-rainfall periods.
 – With higher temperatures, more 
invasion by non-native species is 
expected to occur, particularly on 
mid- and high-latitude islands.
Sea-level rise
The five main direct impacts of sea-level rise 
are inundation from the sea and increased 
flooding and storm damage; loss of coastal 
wetland and near-shore habitats; erosion 
of soft coastlines (beaches, mudflats and 
soft cliffs); saltwater intrusion affecting 
fresh surface and groundwater; and rising 
watertables, which impede drainage.
Global mean sea level has risen steadily over 
the past century or more and will continue 
to do so over the next few centuries at least. 
Coastal regions are especially vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change because of 
the combined actions of sea-level rise and 
increased storm surges.
The estimated minimum projection 
of sea-level rise to 2100 is around 
10–20 centimetres, and the upper projection 
of the IPCC’s 4th assessment report is around 
80 centimetres. The 80-centimetre upper 
projection has a high degree of uncertainty 
because it doesn’t include estimates of 
additional sea-level rise due to the dynamic 
response of ice sheets to global warming (if 
the rate of melting of glaciers in Antarctica 
and Greenland increases, that will result 
in additional sea-level rise above the 
IPCC’s estimates). In its report on coastal 
vulnerability, the Australian Department of 
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency used a 
credible estimate of sea-level rise by 2100 of 
up to 1 metre.
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Figures 2 and 3 show the projected 
increase in floods due to a sea-level rise 
of 50 centimetres. Under this reasonably 
conservative scenario, some islands in the 
Pacific will face an increase in floods to 
between 100 and 10,000 times the frequency 
in their historical records. Coastal regions of 
Australia and New Zealand are also highly 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and flooding.
Sea-level rise will be exacerbated by the 
increased intensity of storms and cyclones 
(see box 1). Increased wave energy and greater 
run-off from land will interact with sea-level 
rise to intensify flooding in vulnerable regions.
Some impacts of sea-level rise can be 
ameliorated by adaptation: wharves can 
be raised and sea walls can be built. But in 
some areas, especially small island states, 
the scope for adaptation is geographically 
limited and the costs of adaptation will be 
disproportionately high. Some adaptation 
actions, such as the construction of retaining 
walls and sea barriers, will change the physical 
and ecological characteristics of coastlines.
Ocean acidification may also exacerbate the 
impacts of sea-level rise on small islands 
and coasts with fringing reefs by increasing 
their vulnerability to damage by storms, 
coral bleaching and rising temperatures. The 
ocean will continue to become more acidic 
as atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) levels 
increase. Progressive acidification will have 
adverse impacts on marine organisms that 
use calcium to build their shells, such as corals.
Coral reefs are expected to be particularly 
vulnerable to the combination of increased 
storminess and cyclone intensity; ocean 
temperature increases, which induce coral 
bleaching and slow coral growth; and 
ocean acidification, which may impair reefs’ 
development and recovery. Coral reefs provide 
protection to low-lying islands, and loss of 
fringing reefs or damage to them will lead 
to greater coastal erosion from storms and 
sea-level rise.
Figure 2:  Increased frequency of inundation due to storm surges and tides with 50 centimetres of 
sea-level rise globally
Note:  Key is left hand column of dots. A factor 100 increase means that a storm tide event which presently happens 
on average once every 100 years (the ‘100-year return event’) will happen annually after sea level has risen by 0.5 m. 
Figure shows only those places where tide records were adequate for analysis. The absence of a dot indicates no data, 
not no sea-level rise.  
Source: ACE CRC 2012 Report Card: Sea-Level Rise, Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre, 
Hobart, 2012, p22
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Figure 3:  Increased frequency of inundation due to storm surges and tides with 50 centimetres of 
sea-level rise in Australia
Note:  Key is right  hand column of dots. A factor 100 increase means that a storm tide event which presently happens 
on average once every 100 years (the ‘100-year return event’) will happen annually after sea level has risen by 0.5 m. 
Figure shows only those places where tide records were adequate for analysis. The absence of a dot indicates no data, 
not no sea-level rise. Source: ACE CRC 2012 Report Card: Sea-Level Rise, Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative 
Research Centre, Hobart, 2012, p22
The Pacific
The Pacific Climate Change Science Program 
(PCCSP) has published climate projections for 
the Pacific region. The PCCSP used 18 global 
climate models and three IPCC emissions 
scenarios to project climate change in three 
periods—to 2030, 2055 and 2090—relative 
to 1990:
 • Temperature in the region is 
projected to rise by 0.5–1.0°C by 2030 
under low, medium and high GHG 
emissions scenarios.
 • By 2055, the range of temperature 
rise will be between 1.0°C and 1.5°C 
(the higher projections reflect higher 
emissions scenarios).
 • By 2090, warming is projected to be 
1.5–2.0°C for a low emissions scenario, 
2.0–2.5°C for the medium emissions 
scenario, and 2.5–3.0°C for a high 
emissions scenario. The number of 
warm nights and extreme temperature 
days greatly increases as the average 
temperature increases.
The PCCSP also projects a widespread increase 
in heavy rain days. For example, given a high 
GHG emissions scenario, extreme rainfall 
events that currently occur on average once 
every 20 years are projected to occur four 
times a year by 2055 and seven times a year 
by 2090.
Heavy weather: Climate and the Australian Defence Force 7
Box 1: Climate change and extreme weather events
While the link between climate change and 
extreme weather is the subject of much 
discussion and scientific caution, emerging 
projections are important for planning and 
preparedness. The IPCC’s special report, 
Managing the risks of extreme events to 
advance climate change adaptation (SREX), 
published in 2012, provides a comprehensive 
synthesis of the links between climate 
change and extreme events. The examples 
given below are from SREX.
Temperature: It is virtually certain (to use the 
terminology of the IPCC) that increases in 
the frequency and magnitude of warm daily 
temperature extremes will occur in the 21st 
century at the global scale. It is very likely 
that the length, frequency and/or intensity 
of warm spells or heatwaves will increase 
globally over land. For example, based on 
historical records and under credible GHG 
emissions scenarios, a 1-in-20 year extreme 
warm weather event is likely to increase by 
1°C to 3°C by the mid-21st century. That is, it’s 
likely that very hot weather will get hotter.
Rainfall: It’s likely that the frequency of heavy 
precipitation, or the proportion of total 
rainfall that comes from heavy falls, will 
increase, particularly in tropical regions and 
near the poles. Heavier rainfall associated 
with cyclones is likely.
Cyclone intensity: It’s likely that the average 
maximum wind speed of tropical cyclones 
will increase. There’s medium confidence 
that extratropical cyclones will shift towards 
the poles.
Sea-level rise: It’s very likely that mean sea-
level rise will contribute to extreme coastal 
flooding. There’s high confidence that areas 
currently undergoing coastal erosion and 
flooding will continue to do so. The impacts 
of sea-level rise will be exacerbated by the 
likely increase in cyclone intensity.
Exposure and vulnerability: Regions, nations 
and communities will be exposed to climate 
change effects in different ways depending 
on a host of socioeconomic and political 
factors, including preparedness, resilience, 
wealth, education, political stability and the 
strength of government institutions and 
civil society. The SREX report places high 
confidence in ‘economic, social, geographic, 
demographic, cultural, institutional, 
governance and environmental factors’ 
influencing exposure and vulnerability to 
extreme climatic events. Similarly, SREX 
states high confidence that ‘settlement 
patterns, urbanisation and changes in 
socioeconomic conditions have all influenced 
observed trends in exposure and vulnerability 
to climate change extremes.’ The climatic 
exposure of small island states and coastal 
communities, and the highly populated 
megadeltas in our region, is discussed 
elsewhere in this report.
Economic loss: The SREX report has high 
confidence that there have been increases 
in economic losses from weather- and 
climate-related disasters. There’s high 
confidence that fatality rates and economic 
losses (as a proportion of gross domestic 
product) are higher in developing countries.
There’s less overall confidence in some 
projections, such as the frequency and 
intensity of droughts, and the models and 
outputs can vary widely from region to 
region. It’s important to note that confidence 
in climate models and their outputs will 
increase as the models become more 
sophisticated and the flow of climate data 
from data-sparse regions increases. It will 
be important for operational agencies to 
be able to obtain sophisticated climate 
outputs and projections and to interpret and 
understand them.
 
Source: IPCC, Managing the risks of extreme 
events to advance climate change adaptation, 
special report of working groups I and II of the IPCC, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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Small island states
Small island states are particularly vulnerable 
to climate change because of their size and 
populations and the multiple climate-related 
stresses expected from climate change. Their 
small area limits options for adaptation, and 
very small low-lying sandy islands may face a 
combination of physical impacts that severely 
reduces their capacity to sustain habitation.
In the tropics, projected increases in 
maximum wind speed during cyclones will 
have an important synergistic effect on other 
climate-related pressures. The band of cyclone 
activity is also projected to spread further 
north and south from the equator, increasing 
the number of small islands affected 
by cyclones.
Small islands are vulnerable to erosion from 
sea-level rise, storms and cyclone intensity, 
to increased flooding from heavier rainfall, 
to the degradation of fringing coral reefs 
and, as a result of the interaction of these 
factors, to the intrusion of salt water into 
freshwater aquifers needed for human and 
agricultural use.
Projected changes in rainfall patterns in 
some regions will also have direct effects on 
the viability of small islands. In the Pacific, a 
projected reduction in annual average rainfall 
of 10% in Kiribati would result in a 20% loss of 
fresh water on Tarawa atoll.
Damage to reefs and near-shore habitats 
in small islands will have impacts on local 
fisheries and tourism, and coastal agriculture 
will be affected by loss of fresh water, 
increased flooding and salinity, and increased 
storm surge and cyclone intensity (see box 2).
Box 2: Fiji
Fiji is the largest economy among the Pacific 
island countries, with a population of around 
860,000. There are 332 islands in Fiji, making 
it vulnerable to coastal impacts of climate 
change and particularly to sea-level rise.
Fiji’s main economic sectors are tourism, 
agriculture and fisheries, all of which are 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and other regional 
climate change impacts. Around a quarter of 
the country’s workforce is employed in sugar-
cane farming and sugar-related industries. 
Floods in Fiji in 2009 and a cyclone in 2010 
combined to reduce the income of Fijian cane 
farmers significantly, pushing them below 
the poverty line.
Viti Levu, Fiji’s main island, contains Suva (the 
capital), the country’s international airport 
at Nadi, most of Fiji’s other major towns, 
and many of the large tourism investments 
in Fiji. Much of this infrastructure is on the 
coast. Suva and the main airport at Nadi 
are connected by air and by a road that 
for significant parts of its route traverses 
low-lying coastal plains. In 2001, flash 
flooding put Nadi under 2 metres of water.
Most of Fiji’s major towns and cities are 
highly susceptible to inundation through 
a combination of sea-level rise and storm 
surge. Suva and Nadi are at high risk of 
flooding, as is the second biggest city, 
Lautoka, which is a major centre for the sugar 
industry and a major export port.
The Fijian tourism industry is directly 
susceptible to infrastructure damage 
from sea-level rise and flooding and from 
increased cyclone intensity. It’s also indirectly 
susceptible to damage to its ‘brand’ through 
rising ocean temperatures causing coral 
bleaching and ocean acidification affecting 
the health of reefs. All of the economy of Fiji 
will be affected by more intense cyclones and 
flooding from sea-level rise and storm surges 
damaging airports, roads, ports and other 
vital infrastructure.
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Asian megadeltas
Low-lying areas of Asia (and Africa) face 
a range of climate change impacts that 
combine to make them particularly 
vulnerable, especially given the large human 
populations in many of these areas. Sea-level 
rise, increased cyclone intensity and, in some 
areas, increased rainfall run-off from more 
intense storms will combine to create greater 
flooding and erosion and increased saltwater 
intrusion. Most of South and Southeast 
Asia’s densest aggregations of people and 
productive lands are on or near the coast, 
including Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, 
Mumbai and Dhaka.
Two hundred and fifty million people live in 
the great river deltas of Asia, from Tianjin 
to Karachi. The Mekong and the Ganges–
Brahmaputra deltas have been rated as 
being at extreme risk from the current rate of 
sea-level rise to 2050, and the Changjian and 
Godavari deltas at medium risk (see figures 4, 
5 and 6). Five of the ten most populous cities 
(Mumbai, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Ho Chi Minh 
City and Kolkata) are exposed to coastal 
flooding, and they and other Asian cities 
are expected to see significant increases in 
population over this century.
Using a conservative projection of global 
sea-level rise of 40 centimetres by the end 
of this century, the IPCC’s 4th assessment 
report estimated that the number of people 
affected by flooding in a given year would 
increase from 13 million to 94 million, with 
60% of this increase being in the region from 
Thailand to the Philippines (including Vietnam 
and Indonesia).
The Mekong delta
The densely populated Mekong delta provides 
46% of Vietnam’s total food production, and 
low-lying and coastal areas of the delta are 
Figure 4:  Low-lying Asian megadeltas
Note: The current combined population of these nine low-lying Asian megadeltas is about 250 million. 
Source: R J Nicholls in Church et al., Understanding sea-level rise and variability, Blackwell, UK, 2010, p. 20. Adapted from 
Harvey (ed.), Global change and integrated coastal management, 2006 (Colin D Woodroffe et al., pp. 277–314, map with 
kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media).
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Figure 5:  Relative vulnerability of deltas to current rates of sea-level rise (in terms of displaced people)
Source: R J Nicholls in Church et al., Understanding sea-level rise and variability, Blackwell, UK, 2010, p. 20. Reproduced 
from Nicholls et al, Coastal systems and low-lying areas. In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2007
facing increasing population pressures. These 
factors combine to make the Mekong delta 
particularly vulnerable to climate change.
The 2009 Mekong Delta Climate Change 
Forum Report9 (MORBE) showed that by 2030, 
under a moderate to high GHG emissions 
scenario (the IPCC’s A2 scenario), sea-level rise 
and climate change would affect:
 • 325,000 mainly rural homes in the coastal 
Ca Mau Province
 • 4,500 kilometres of roads subject to 
flooding
 • a further 13,000 kilometres of roads 
subject to extreme events.
By 2050, under the same emissions scenario, 
more than 1 million people in the Mekong 
delta would be directly affected by coastal 
erosion and land loss. Ho Chi Minh City’s ports 
and major road systems would be vulnerable 
to extreme events.
The MORBE report predicts that a (low-end) 
sea-level rise of 25 centimetres will lead to 
the permanent inundation of large areas of 
the Mekong delta by shifting the coastline 
up to 25 kilometres inland in some places. A 
40-centimetre sea-level rise would increase 
the shift to 50 kilometres in some areas. 
Saltwater intrusion from sea-level rise and 
storm surges will reduce the available arable 
land and affect the quality of freshwater 
supplies in the delta.
Shifts in rainfall patterns will also have 
impacts on traditional agricultural practices 
and productivity in the Mekong. Increased 
river flows are projected during the monsoon 
season and decreased flows in the dry season, 
leading to more flooding in the wet season 
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Figure 6:  Regions bordering Australia vulnerable to sea-level rise
Note: Based on a scenario for the 2080s, assuming a middle estimate of global mean sea-level rise by that time of 
45 centimetres. 
Source: R J Nicholls in Church et al., Understanding sea-level rise and variability, Blackwell, UK, 2010, p. 30, adapted from 
R J Nicholls, FMJ Hoozemans and M Marchand, ‘ Increasing flood risk and wetland losses due to global sea-level rise: 
regional and global analyses, Global Environmental Change 9, S69-S87. 
and greater water shortage in the dry. Rice 
production in the wet season is projected to 
decrease by over 40%, and erosion (sediment 
loss) from extreme events, sea-level rise and 
storm surge will also affect the agricultural 
productivity of the delta. The Mekong is 
already subject to extensive changes brought 
about in part by changes in river flow (for 
example, by the building of dams) and 
changed agricultural practices. From 1973 to 
2008, the east coast of the delta retreated 
at 30–50 metres per year, while the west 
coast advanced at the rate of 70–100 metres 
per year.
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and 
Timor-Leste
The world’s equatorial regions will experience 
lower than global average temperature 
increases with climate change. Indonesia’s 
mean annual temperature has increased 
by 0.3°C since 1990, and temperatures in 
the region are projected to continue to rise 
by 2.5°C over the century compared to the 
1980–1999 period. The frequency of extreme 
temperature days and high rainfall days 
is expected to increase over the course of 
the century.
Tropical cyclone intensity is likely to increase, 
with more cyclone-related precipitation. Total 
rainfall and rainfall intensity are projected to 
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increase across Indonesia. Projected changes 
to rainfall patterns include a lengthening of 
the dry season, with more intense rainfall 
during a shorter wet season resulting in 
increased flooding.
Projections of climate change impacts on 
agriculture are difficult and require good 
regional climate records and access to 
fine-scale climate modelling. The IPCC’s 
4th assessment report projected crop yields 
in Southeast Asia to increase in some areas 
by up to 20% and decrease in others by 30% 
by 2050.
Sea-level rise, storm surge and coastal 
inundation will affect low-lying communities, 
agriculture and critical infrastructure. Rice 
production is predicted to decline in some 
coastal areas due to inundation. Sea-level 
rise, ocean warming and ocean acidification 
will damage fisheries, especially coastal and 
artisanal fisheries, which have limited capacity 
to adapt. Coral reefs in Asia and Southeast 
Asia are already under severe pressure from 
human- and weather-induced degradation. 
It’s been estimated that one-third of reefs in 
Asia will be lost during the next 30 years.
Projections10 of the impacts of climate 
change on economic activity are difficult at 
best, but some attempts have been made 
to quantify local impacts in the Indonesian 
archipelago. A 2007 study11 on climate change 
in Indonesia stated:
[D]ecrease in [agricultural] yield [due to 
sea-level rise] would cause, in the Subang 
District [of Indonesia] alone, about 43,000 
farm laborers to lose their jobs. In addition, 
more than 81,000 farmers would have to 
look for other sources of income due to the 
inundation of their rice fields or prawn and 
fish farms due to sea-level rise.
Unirrigated crops, such as maize, which 
is grown throughout the Indonesian 
archipelago and is a main crop in Timor-Leste, 
are vulnerable to decreased and irregular 
rainfall. Agriculture employs up to 85% 
of the Timorese workforce, making the 
Timorese economy particularly vulnerable to 
adverse impacts on the sector. Timor-Leste 
is a net importer of food, making food 
supply an important consideration for its 
economic development.
Projections for climate change in Papua New 
Guinea show increased air and sea surface 
temperatures, and more frequent and intense 
extremely hot days and days of extreme 
rainfall. Annual average rainfall is projected 
to increase.  Climate models show a general 
trend to increasing tropical cyclone intensity, 
but there is currently insufficient evidence 
to apply this global trend to specific sub 
regions of the tropics. The 4th assessment 
report states that South and Southeast Asia 
will experience increased morbidity and 
mortality due to higher rates of cholera and 
diarrhoeal disease. Other studies have pointed 
to an altitudinal spread of malaria in Papua in 
recent years.
Australia
The latest report from the federal 
government’s Climate Commission says that 
the weather extremes experienced around 
the country this summer were made worse 
by climate change. Extreme heat, floods and 
bushfires were all aggrevated by a shifting 
climate and the Commission warns the 
trend is likely to continue.12 In State of the 
Climate 2012, the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) 
and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology 
examined climate trends in Australia. 
Warming land and ocean temperatures, 
varied rainfall patterns and increasing 
GHG emissions in and around Australia 
are consistent with global climate change 
measurements.13
Continental warming across Australia is 
projected to be around the global mean (that 
Heavy weather: Climate and the Australian Defence Force 13
is, from 2.4°C to 6.4°C warming by 2100 under 
a ‘business as usual’ GHG scenario). Warming 
will be less in coastal regions than inland, and 
greater in the north than the south. Median 
estimates of warming by 2030 show a rise 
of around 1°C above 1990 temperatures, and 
a mean rise of 3.4°C by 2100. More frequent 
and/or longer heatwaves are projected, and 
the northwest of Australia is expected to be 
most affected. Extreme temperature days are 
also projected to increase in frequency, and 
the maximum temperature of extreme days is 
likely to increase.
The number of very high and extreme fire 
danger days is projected to increase across 
Australia, and the length of the fire season 
will increase.
Rainfall is projected to generally decrease 
across southern Australia, with declines in 
winter rainfall in southwest Western Australia 
and a loss of winter and spring rainfall in the 
southeast of the continent. Parts of southern 
Australia are expected to experience a 
greater number of droughts. Projections of 
rainfall in northern Australia are uncertain: 
some models show an increase in spring 
and summer monsoonal rainfall and others 
don’t. Water availability is projected to decline 
over the century in southern and eastern 
Australia as the result of a combination of 
increased temperatures and changing rainfall 
patterns. The Murray–Darling Basin faces 
reduced surface water availability, especially 
in the south.
Some climate models project that cyclone 
intensity will increase, with greater maximum 
wind speeds and increased cyclone-related 
rainfall. While this trend is expected on a 
global scale there is insufficient evidence to 
ascribe this trend to specific sub regions of 
the tropics. As in the average projected trend 
for the  global southern hemisphere tropics, 
cyclones are expected to build and track 
further south. Current models suggest the 
effect may be greater on the east coast of 
Australia than in the west. 
More intense rainfall will affect many parts 
of Australia. Some rainfall projection models 
show the number of heavy rainfall days 
increasing in eastern Australia. In general, 
heavy rainfall events are expected to increase 
due to higher atmospheric temperature 
and humidity.
The 85% of Australians who live along the 
coast and in Australia’s largest cities will be 
affected by sea-level rise. Besides civil and 
naval ports, much of Australia’s other critical 
infrastructure is built in coastal regions. 
Sea-level rise will cause increased coastal 
flooding and exacerbate erosion on coasts 
and in estuaries, and saltwater intrusion will 
affect wetlands (Figure 3 shows projected 
increase in storm tide floods in areas of 
coastal Australia under a sea-level rise of 
50 centimetres). Coastal flooding from rising 
sea levels will be exacerbated by increased 
cyclone intensity, flooding from the land in 
heavy storms, erosion and vegetation loss.
The Australian Government’s 2010 position 
paper, Adapting to climate change14, 
summarised the effects of climate change 
already being experienced in Australia: rising 
temperatures, reduced rainfall in some 
regions, severe droughts and extreme fire 
weather. The paper made clear the serious 
and pervasive risks of climate change that will 
occur in the next 20–30 years and emphasised 
the need for government, business and 
the community to pay attention now to 
climate adaptation.
The January 2009 heatwave in southeastern 
Australia set new record temperatures, 
which reached over 45°C in Melbourne 
and Adelaide. The soaring temperatures 
negatively affected infrastructure, health 
and ecosystems. The Basslink Interconnector, 
which transfers electricity between Victoria 
and Tasmania, shut down when temperatures 
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exceeded its optimal design limits (45°C 
in Victoria and 35°C in Tasmania), reducing 
Melbourne’s power supply. Rail tracks buckled 
in the heat, delaying transport. Over 370 
more deaths were recorded in Victoria than 
would usually be expected for the time of 
year. Climate change in Australia will result 
in more heatwaves and hotter and drier 
conditions in some regions, increasing the 
risk of more intense and frequent bushfires 
and climate-related fatalities, and putting 
pressure on essential water, electricity and 
transport infrastructure and property.
The Top End is likely to face extremes of 
warming. The current annual average 
temperature in Darwin is 27.8°C. By 
2070, it could rise to 31°C. On average, 
Darwin experiences 11 days per year with 
temperatures over 35°C, but this may rise 
to 230 days by 2070. Northern Australia will 
experience increased spring and summer 
monsoonal rainfall and cyclonic intensity.
The Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems 
Cooperative Research Centre (ACE CRC) 
recently released Report Card: Sea-Level 
Rise 201215, which documents the latest 
developments in sea-level rise research and 
summarises the effects of sea-level rise on 
coastal inundation and erosion. The report 
card suggests that sea levels rose during the 
20th century at a rate not experienced for the 
past 6,000 years. The ACE CRC projects that 
sea levels around Australia will rise by at least 
30–50 centimetres by 2090.
Floods caused by sea-level rise and 
exacerbated by intense storm surges will 
be more frequent. The ACE CRC calculates 
that a 0.1 metre rise in sea level increases the 
frequency of flooding by a factor of about 
Box 3: The Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Made up of two atolls with a total area of a 
little over 7 square kilometres and 27 coral 
islands, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands support a 
permanent population of around 600 people. 
Altogether, the islands have land area of just 
over 14 square kilometres with 26 kilometres 
of coastline. The highest elevation is 5 metres.
Agriculture and other industry are limited. 
Tourism is of growing importance, and the 
small territory strongly promotes its natural 
environment. The local population relies 
in part on fishing and growing vegetables 
and other produce, but most provisions are 
imported into the territory. Freshwater lenses 
on the larger islands provide Cocos with its 
limited water supply.
Major infrastructure is limited to Home and 
West islands. Low-lying West Island has an 
asphalt landing strip about 2,550 metres long. 
Climate change projections for this region 
indicate that the islands face tropical 
cyclones of increased severity and greater 
storm surge. Infrastructure, including the 
strategically important airfield, will be 
affected by sea-level rise. As for other small 
tropical islands, the impacts of sea-level rise 
will be compounded by storm surge, cyclone 
damage and the degradation of coral reefs 
from bleaching and ocean acidification.
The ADF Posture Review highlights the 
strategic value of the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands. Defence Minister Stephen Smith has 
indicated that the islands may be used for 
a future air base jointly operated by the US 
and Australia.
The current Cocos Islands military airfield 
is vulnerable to a combination of climate 
change impacts, including sea-level rise and 
increased cyclone intensity.
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three. This means that at a sea-level rise of 
0.5 metres an event—which occurs every 
100 years—is likely to occur several times 
each year.
For each metre of sea-level rise, sandy 
shorelines move inland by approximately 
100 metres, disrupting coastal infrastructure 
and increasing the salinity of the watertable.
The CSIRO’s 2012 marine climate change 
report card16 outlines future coastal recession 
and inundation around Australia. Sea levels 
are rising fastest around northern Australia, 
while warming ocean temperatures and 
accelerated currents are driving marine 
life south.
The CSIRO’s research points to increasing 
ocean acidification, which may reduce 
the life of naval equipment and the ability 
to navigate.
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean
Antarctica plays a large role in the global 
climate system. The vast, cold continent holds 
about 90% of the world’s ice—or around 
60% of the world’s fresh water. The Southern 
Ocean surrounding Antarctica is a significant 
driver of the planet’s ocean currents, and links 
all three of the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans. The Southern Ocean stores heat and 
carbon, providing a significant brake on the 
rate of climate change to date. The world’s 
oceans have stored about 90% of the extra 
heat generated by human activities since the 
1960s and 30% of the additional CO2 produced 
by humans. The ocean below 30  South is 
responsible for about 40% of the global ocean 
take-up of anthropogenic CO2.
Land and ocean temperatures have increased 
in the Antarctic Peninsula in the past 50 years. 
This part of Antarctica is showing the most 
signs of change in the form of increased loss 
of ice shelves and subsequent greater glacial 
flow. There have been significant seasonal 
changes in sea-ice distribution, including an 
overall loss of around 25% of sea ice, and a 
shortening of the period that the peninsular 
region is covered by sea ice. However, there’s 
been a net increase in sea ice in the Ross Sea 
region south of New Zealand, increasing the 
total extent of Antarctic sea ice by around 1%.
The West Antarctic ice sheet has been losing 
mass (that is, more ice is lost to the sea than 
accumulates in the ice sheet). This decrease 
has been partly offset by increased snowfall 
in East Antarctica. It’s been estimated that 
Antarctica as a whole contributed around 
0.14 millimetres per year to global sea-level 
rise from 1961 to 2003, and that the rate rose 
to 0.21 millimetres in the period from 1993 to 
2003. The contribution of the Greenland and 
Antarctic ice sheets is the greatest current 
uncertainty in global projections of sea-level 
rise—increased loss of ice from Antarctica will 
push up global sea-level rise projections.
Much of the East Antarctic ice sheet is 
grounded below sea level. Before that 
discovery, it was generally thought that, unlike 
the West Antarctic ice sheet, most of the ice 
sheet in East Antarctica sat on the continent 
above sea level. The significance of this 
finding is that as the Southern Ocean warms 
it will be able to penetrate further under the 
ice shelves, increasing melting and loss of ice 
from glacial streams and accelerating the rate 
of sea-level rise. The Totten Glacier in East 
Antarctica is currently showing accelerated ice 
loss close to the Antarctic coast.
Increased CO2 in the atmosphere has led to 
changes in the acidity of the Southern Ocean 
and potential impacts on the ocean’s marine 
life and ecosystems. There’s now a strong 
scientific debate about the potential ‘slowing 
down’ of the Southern Ocean’s ability to 
absorb CO2. If that were to occur, it would 
have the effect of increasing the rate of 
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atmospheric temperature rise, as less carbon 
could be stored in the ocean.
Climate models indicate that the Southern 
Ocean will continue to change in response to 
increased GHG emissions, producing further 
ocean warming and freshening, changes 
in ocean currents, a greater contribution 
to sea-level rise through glacial melt, and 
changes in the extent and volume of Antarctic 
sea ice. Although surface temperatures in 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean will warm 
more slowly than elsewhere on the planet, 
the projected changes are profound. The rapid 
warming of deep ocean waters surrounding 
Antarctica is greater than in any other ocean.
Changes in the volume and distribution of sea 
ice will, among other things, alter the primary 
productivity of the Southern Ocean, with 
as yet uncertain impacts on marine species 
and ecosystems. Increased ocean acidity will 
also affect some species, but it’s too early 
to predict how these changes will affect 
Southern Ocean ecosystems and current and 
potential fisheries.
The Southern Ocean supports the world’s 
largest underexploited fishery—the Antarctic 
krill fishery. It’s currently fished at around 
400,000 tonnes per year, but a well-regulated 
fishery could support a catch of an order of 
magnitude greater. The fishery is regulated 
by the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, in which 
Australia, a founding member, Depository 
nation and Secretariat host, plays an 
important role.
Implications for the Australian 
Defence Force
Projected regional and domestic climate 
change impacts mean that the ADF will 
face new demands and stresses on its force 
structure, personnel and roles. Climate change 
will affect where, when, why and how the 
ADF operates.17
The issue of climate change presents 
broad challenges to the whole national 
security community. Defence is not the 
lead department charged with dealing 
with climate change; nor will it be in the 
future. However, the ADF will need to form 
partnerships and collaborate with other 
agencies, industry and external bodies to 
respond to the security impacts of climate 
change, which are almost always indirect.
Missions
Climate change is transforming the 
conventional roles of security actors.18
As a threat multiplier, it has the potential 
to generate and exacerbate destabilising 
conditions that could reshape the regional 
security environment (see Figure 7).19
Stabilisation
Climate-induced population displacement, 
resource wars and the further weakening 
of fragile states are some of the potential 
consequences of a changing climate. It’s 
possible that dissatisfaction with government 
actions to mitigate climate change, while 
so far limited to the urban educated 
population, could contribute to domestic 
and regional instability.20  All this could see an 
increase in the ADF’s involvement in regional 
stabilisation missions.
Defence will also need to plan more for its role 
in domestic disaster response missions (see 
below).  
Defence cooperation
Greater cooperation with regional states on 
climate risks will be beneficial. The current 
Defence Cooperation Program should be 
expanded to include resilience support in 
states experiencing the effects of climate 
change. Defence’s expertise in logistics, 
engineering, hydrology and energy planning 
could be leveraged here.
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Neighbouring states may request an increase 
in Defence assistance to cope with the effects 
of climate change. Low-lying islands in the 
Pacific, as noted above, may no longer be 
able to be populated due to reduced water 
availability and rising sea levels, storm surges 
and saltwater intrusions, exacerbating 
population pressures. The ADF may be called 
on to help relocate villages or reinforce coastal 
infrastructure such as airports and ports.
While climate-induced population 
displacement in the Asia–Pacific region is a 
possible consequence of climate change, its 
likelihood shouldn’t be exaggerated: local 
people are innovative in dealing with threats 
and usually move locally to get away from 
them, rather than to other countries.
Mitigation
The general aim of disaster relief has been 
a return to the conditions of life as it was 
before the disaster, but the permanent 
effects of climate change may make that 
return improbable or impossible. Future ADF 
disaster relief missions, working with AusAID 
and non-government organisations, will give 
greater emphasis to building societal capacity 
and disaster risk reduction measures. The ADF 
will need to incorporate these features into its 
regional engagement programs.
Regional cooperation
Climate change will present real opportunities 
for regional militaries to unite to deal with 
a common problem. Developing strategic 
partnerships with regional defence forces 
Figure 7:  Links between the climate system, natural resources, human security and societal stability
Source: J Scheffran et al., Science, 2012; 336: 869. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
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to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and 
contributing to joint capacity-building efforts, 
will enhance regional security.
Australia should become more involved in the 
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 
operated by US Pacific Command (PACOM), 
which facilitates planning and education 
for natural disasters and humanitarian risks 
across the Asia–Pacific region. Elements of 
Australia’s intelligence community should 
develop periodic ‘stress testing’ for states 
in our area of strategic interest to examine 
their ability to manage potentially disruptive 
climate events. The ADF operates on 
‘warning times’, so it needs to understand 
how environmental changes can affect 
risk management.
Regional humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief
In the coming decades, the ADF is likely 
to witness an increase in the number of 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HA/DR) missions. HA/DR will be increasingly 
used by nation-states as a means to build 
strategic partnerships in a (comparatively) 
cost-effective manner while maintaining 
military readiness and hedging against 
future tensions.21
As a percentage of gross national product, 
Australian military spending is now at its 
lowest since 1938. This is now translating 
into reductions in capability, such as the 
cancellation of self-propelled artillery and 
delayed orders for the Joint Strike Fighter. The 
appetite for long-term operations, particularly 
in the Middle East, may be waning. But  
HA/DR roles will be attractive: they normally 
last weeks or months, rather than years or 
decades. Current Defence procurements, such 
as the helicopter landing dock (LHD) craft 
and C-17s, will increase HA/DR capabilities in 
the ADF.
With a renewed US focus on the Asia–Pacific, 
HA/DR missions can be used as a means 
to maintain military readiness, exercise 
capabilities in a non-threatening manner, and 
build partnerships and regional trust. HA/DR 
can serve to strengthen allied interoperability.
A more enduring reason for increased HA/DR 
relates to climate change, which is causing an 
upsurge in the intensity of natural disasters, 
including floods, wildfires, droughts and 
extreme events such as heatwaves (see 
box 4).
Domestic disaster response
On the home front, ADF support during the 
2009 Victorian bushfires, Queensland floods 
and Cyclone Yasi in 2011 resulted in some of 
the largest ADF deployments in Australia.22
During Operation Flood Assist, some 
1,500 military personnel from all three 
services were deployed to 58 townships 
across 21 municipalities from Townsville 
to Toowoomba.
No longer is the Christmas break considered 
a stand-down period of rest and relaxation: 
it’s become part of the ADF operational 
fabric. Certain ADF force elements are 
ready to be deployed at short notice over 
Australian summers in the event of floods, 
fires or cyclones. Climate change is already 
influencing ADF force generation (see box 5).
Domestic HA/DR missions don’t make 
demands only on the three armed services; 
a whole-of-government input at all tiers 
is becoming increasingly important. For 
example, during operations Flood Assist 
and Yasi Assist the Defence Imagery 
and Geospatial Organisation produced 
flood mapping, situational awareness, 
analytical support and cyclone damage 
assessment products for local, state and 
federal authorities.
Heavy weather: Climate and the Australian Defence Force 19
Box 4: Regional disasters and the ADF
Most of the damage caused by natural 
disasters, particularly extreme weather, 
consistently occurs in the Asia–Pacific. In 2011, 
Asia accounted for 44% of global disasters, 
86% of the victims and 75% of the damage. 
Civilian authorities expect and demand 
military capabilities in order to respond to the 
increasing scale of devastation.
Over the past 21 years, the ADF has been 
involved in 30 offshore disaster relief 
missions. Between July 2005 and June 2011, 
the ADF contributed to 11 regional disaster 
relief missions. In all of those missions, it’s 
never been the lead agency. Defence acts 
as part of a whole-of-government effort 
managed by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade.
Box 5: The ADF and domestic disaster response
In the 2009 Defence White Paper, 
the government expected the ADF to 
support emergency response efforts 
for natural disasters in Australia and 
our neighbourhood.
But, according to the white paper, 
those tasks don’t create a requirement 
for maintaining an extensive range of 
specialised capabilities within the ADF 
(they’re not ‘force structure determinants’).
Elevating disaster assistance to an ADF 
core mission will generate costs, benefits 
and risks. Costs may include disruption 
to training schedules as personnel 
are deployed to response efforts, and 
increased maintenance costs.
The benefits it will bring include providing 
personnel with operational activities after 
the ADFs drawdown in the Middle East, 
Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. 
It will also expose them to work in a 
multiagency environment.
The risks of not being involved in disaster 
response include damage to the ADF’s 
reputation if it fails to meet community 
expectations, as occurred when the Navy 
couldn’t provide an amphibious ship for the 
2011 cyclone season.
Of course, that approach won’t be resource 
neutral. But being better able to respond 
to disasters won’t require the ADF to 
bring major disaster-specific capabilities 
into existence; rather, it will give greater 
emphasis to dual-use capabilities 
and might require some additional 
elements being maintained to provide 
better coverage.
Many of the capabilities that would be 
needed to respond to domestic disasters 
would be useful to the ADF in some of its 
other tasks, including disaster relief around 
the region.
During Yasi Assist, deployable ADF 
communications assets supported Centrelink 
teams who provided disaster recovery 
payments to those in need, ensuring 
secure access.
With the likelihood that such missions will 
increase, there’s a requirement to ensure 
that the ADF is better coordinated with 
the domestic emergency services. But that 
also requires the civil authorities to have a 
realistic understanding of the contribution 
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that Defence can make, including its inability 
to pre-position high-readiness forces and 
equipment for long periods in case a natural 
disaster occurs.
Integrated communications and command 
structures, joint doctrine and policy, and 
domestic HA/DR mission rehearsal exercises 
should be the basis for improving future 
regional and domestic response. In the future, 
the ADF should assign part of its ready reserve 
or regular force to dedicated HA/DR tasks.
HA/DR implications
In July 2012, Defence Minister Stephen Smith 
announced that Australia, Indonesia and the 
US are planning to hold full-scale trilateral 
HA/DR exercises this year under the auspices 
of the East Asia Summit HA/DR framework.
There’ll be more calls for the ADF to play its 
role in developing regional HA/DR doctrine, 
joint HA/DR exercises and even the joint 
development of regional HA/DR capabilities 
that might be priority assigned to nations in 
times of crisis. The ADF will need to develop 
closer relationships with non-government 
organisations for joint planning, 
communications and information sharing. 
Defence will also need to work more with the 
Australian Civilian Corps in HA/DR missions. 
Cooperation with New Zealand will be 
important, as the ADF is likely to operate with 
New Zealand in HA/DR in the South Pacific.
With the contraction of the ADF’s budget and 
the expected increase in HA/DR tasks, the 
ADF will again be asked to do more with less. 
Multi-use capabilities that can be used in  
HA/DR tasks and in executing the full range of 
ongoing national security related missions will 
be critical. The introduction into service of the 
two LHD ships and the associated amphibious 
doctrine involving all three services will 
become representative of the types of joint 
capabilities increasingly required by the ADF. 
The additional C-17s will be very useful in  
HA/DR missions.
Of particular importance will be the ability 
of government and military commanders to 
tailor the LHD taskforce to meet particular 
mission requirements. Some missions may 
require forces to deal with a deteriorating 
security situation, but HA/DR missions will 
require the ADF to grow its combat support 
and logistic support corps, such as engineers, 
medical, supply and transport. There may 
need to be more consideration given to the 
ship-to-shore issue, with better landing craft 
for HA/DR missions.
The Army Engineer Corps could be expected 
to be in high demand: it remains the only 
element capable of deploying qualified 
tradespeople, engineers, mobile water 
purification plants, detection dog teams, 
and equipment for clearing debris or 
construction tasks.
However, Australia’s engineering and 
construction squadrons are penny-packeted 
across the Army’s brigades. Given the likely 
increase in HA/DR, Defence should give 
greater attention to their tasks, size and 
geographical distribution.
Concurrent disasters
The ADF needs to be prepared for the 
co-occurrence of extreme weather requiring 
HA/DR assistance. What will happen when 
domestic infrastructure is damaged by an 
extreme weather event at the same time 
as another such disaster overseas requires a 
response? The ADF should start planning for 
responding to scenarios such as a devastating 
bushfire at home at the same time that a 
storm surge hits the Pacific.
Capability development and 
acquisition
The ADF will need to integrate up-to-date 
scientific research into capability planning and 
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assessments, and encourage design solutions 
for military capabilities to withstand tougher 
environmental conditions.
Climate change should therefore be of 
interest to those agencies responsible for 
Defence capability planning—the Capability 
Development Group, the Defence Materiel 
Organisation, service headquarters and the 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
(DSTO), which are jointly responsible 
for defining capability requirements, 
conducting tests and evaluations, introducing 
systems into service and delivering 
through-life support.
A different operating environment
Although climate change is unlikely to affect 
ADF capability in the next 5–10 years, it’s likely 
to do so over the next 20 years. The lifespan of 
some capabilities, such as some information 
and communications technology systems, 
is only a few years. However, the lifespans 
of others, for example major platforms such 
as aircraft or submarines, extend over many 
decades—and military infrastructure might 
be around for more than a century.
Today’s capability requirements exist in a far 
different operating environment from when 
they’re fully introduced into service in, say, 
2030 and retired in 2050–60.
For example, the ADF will need to consider 
the impact on Australia’s next generation 
of strike fighter aircraft when they are in 
open-air hangers at RAAF Tindal in a 2°C 
warmer world; the suitability of runway 
surfaces under higher temperatures; the 
impact of hotter temperatures on the storage 
of munitions, fuel and other supplies and 
capabilities that are currently warehoused in 
the open; and whether the single rail line that 
links Darwin to Adelaide, and transports many 
military goods and services, is designed to 
withstand such heat stress.23 More analyses 
will be needed to understand the impact on 
capabilities when today’s extreme conditions 
become more extreme tomorrow.
Next-generation capability requirements 
conceived in 2030 and operating out to 2080 
could potentially be operating in radically 
different conditions. The long timescales of 
climate change seldom intersect with human 
planning horizons, but capability development 
is an important exception.
New environmental standards
Environmental restrictions on the operation 
of military equipment may well exceed 
what the ADF deems to be acceptable at the 
start of capability development planning. 
Getting particular items of equipment up to 
compliance standards will incur costs.
Because the ADF faces an increase in 
noncombat activities, the procurement of 
dual-use equipment will become critical. 
Changes in temperature and extremes in 
weather conditions will affect the operation 
of equipment and deployment conditions.
Airlift capacity will become increasingly 
important in the growing number of HA/DR 
missions, and a fleet with the potential to 
function in multiple roles will be essential.
Adequate numbers of helicopters capable 
of operating in extreme weather will also 
be necessary and, despite the significant 
capabilities of the LHD ships, a hospital ship 
may need to be considered.
Naval assets may be required more for 
fisheries enforcement work. Illegal fishing in 
Australian waters may increase as climate 
change, migration and human pressure 
interact to deplete fish stocks and increase 
migration in surrounding regions.
Ocean acidification
Warming oceans and increasing ocean 
acidification will affect domestic and regional 
fisheries. The Secretariat of the Pacific 
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Community forecasts that warming oceans 
will reduce the viability and productivity of 
coral reef fisheries that currently provide 
essential livelihoods and food security 
throughout the region.24
Changes to coral reef fisheries may 
cause economic dislocation, resulting in 
displacement and weakened states. Defence 
may therefore be called upon to provide 
capabilities to contribute to the long-term 
stability of Australia’s backyard.
Antarctica and Southern Ocean 
operations
Climate change impacts in Antarctica and 
the Southern Ocean (such as more extreme 
weather events or more iceberg calving) 
may lead to more calls on ADF assets to 
contribute to enforcement, protection and 
monitoring activities in Antarctica and the 
Southern Ocean.
While the greatest regional changes in 
the Antarctic are now being recorded 
in the Antarctic Peninsula, higher ocean 
temperatures may result in increased sea ice 
and glacial loss in East Antarctica—Australia’s 
region of interest. More iceberg calving will 
present greater shipping hazards, loss of 
sea ice will create greater access for illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing vessels, 
and more intense high-latitude storms 
will pose greater threats to legitimate and 
illegitimate shipping activity.
An increase in sea traffic through the 
Southern Ocean as tourist numbers increase 
and routes become accessible in some parts 
of Antarctica might see the Navy involved in 
more search and rescue missions. Depending 
on how government decides to deploy the 
RAN, it may need to maintain ships with 
icebreaking capabilities to cope with an 
increase in missions in the region. There’s 
likely to be a need for multi-role vessels with 
sea-keeping ability in the Southern Ocean. 
Increasing demand for search and rescue in 
the Southern Ocean will require RAAF assets 
with long enough ‘legs’ to loiter in the area.
Changing sea states will have operational 
implications for the RAN. For example, the 
accelerated melting of ice shelves, which 
increases the number of icebergs, will affect 
the Navy’s ability to navigate and operate 
in Antarctica if it’s judged necessary for the 
Navy to develop a polar capability.
Australia’s defence assets may be required 
to support logistic efforts for our Antarctic 
bases. This will be assisted by the possible 
opening of a second Antarctic runway in the 
Australian Antarctic Territory.
Data
Environmental intelligence
Being involved in the gathering of 
environmental intelligence will help the ADF 
to map potential scenarios and cascading 
impacts brought about by climate change, 
and assist Defence to better formulate 
appropriate responses.
In the US Navy (USN) and Coast Guard, 
surveillance assets are already often used 
to collect critical scientific data on ice 
mass loss, oceanic changes and sea ice. For 
example, a USN nuclear attack submarine 
has been made available for an unclassified 
scientific expedition to the Arctic to gather 
ice-thickness measurements, although the 
USN does this only when the work doesn’t 
interfere with any operational mission 
planned in the Arctic.
Both the US and UK navies have declassified 
submarine data to allow climate scientists 
to better understand climate change in 
the Arctic. 
The ADF is suited to making a contribution 
to environmental data collection, since it 
has both the means and authority to access 
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remote locations that are often too expensive 
and inaccessible for scientific or commercial 
research missions. By analogy the Australian 
Antarctic Division shares environmental data 
with commercial shipping, the cruise sector 
and our fishing industry. 
The ADF is also relatively predictable in 
terms of where and when it operates. This 
is important because it allows the collection 
of geographically consistent data over long 
periods. This might yield better spatial 
resolution and offer scientists greater 
accuracy for climate models. Refined models 
will inevitably bring about more informed 
decisions by national security professionals, 
including capability planners.
One example where the ADF could use its 
assets to aid climate data gathering would be 
the RAN Armidale class patrol boats working 
across Australia’s northern approaches. 
These platforms could be fitted with 
instrumentation to record both short- and 
long-term environmental change.
Hydrography and oceanography
There are opportunities for the Navy to better 
integrate its hydrographic, meteorological 
and oceanographic fleet for aiding climate 
science. Though limited in size, Australia’s 
naval oceanographic capabilities may prove 
valuable for many Pacific island and smaller 
Asian nations that lack such means and are far 
more exposed to rapid climate change.
The use of these assets following 
extreme events or to track longer term 
effects of climate change may also 
inform civilian mariners, emergency 
services and governments on changes to 
coastal geomorphology.
Submarine operations might be able to 
provide a unique method for collecting 
subsurface data in the Indian Ocean and 
the archipelagic waters to our north. If this 
isn’t practical, submariners will still need to 
understand how climate change will affect 
the properties and dynamics of the ocean. 
Projected oceanic changes include changes to 
thermal structure, salinity and pH (acidity). A 
recent US study found that such changes may 
affect the performance of acoustic sensors 
and torpedoes and the future viability of USN 
databases that are used in tactical planning.25
Regional force surveillance units
The Army’s land forces may contribute to 
climate science through the three regional 
force surveillance units (RFSUs) centred on the 
Pilbara, the Kimberley – Northern Territory 
and far north Queensland. The importance 
of RFSUs is likely to grow, according to the 
recently released Australian Defence Force 
Posture Review.26
RFSUs could also contribute to climate science 
through the use of Indigenous soldiers 
as cultural recorders to understand how 
climate change is affecting outback and 
coastal communities.
Adaptation and mitigation
One of the most significant adaptation 
challenges facing the ADF will be to manage 
the vast Defence estate under the effects 
of climate change. The estate encompasses 
one of the largest infrastructure portfolios 
in Australia, including 389 properties 
(72 significant bases), 25,000 assets and 
stewardship over millions of hectares across 
the continent.
The vast bulk of the Defence estate and 
supporting infrastructure is built to tolerances 
based on Australian standards, which are 
in turn based on existing knowledge of 
Australian conditions. Climate-proofing the 
estate will become more important.
Sea-level rise impacts
Defence sites at or near sea level are exposed 
to risk. The damage caused by a combination 
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of sea-level rise, storm surge and river 
flooding may extend beyond maritime 
infrastructure. The government’s 2011 report, 
Climate change risks to coastal buildings and 
infrastructure, estimates that more than 
$220 billion (in 2008 dollars) in commercial, 
industrial, road, rail and residential assets 
may be exposed to inundation and erosion 
risks under a high-end sea-level rise scenario 
by 2100.27 The Climate Institute’s 2012 report 
on managing climate risks indicates the 
unpreparedness of Australia’s infrastructure 
to withstand the impacts of natural disasters 
and climate-related stresses.28
Defence is running studies to assess the 
vulnerabilities of military bases to sea-level 
rise. Bases such as RAAF Townsville (Qld), 
Williamstown (NSW) and Learmonth, as 
well as Leeuwin Barracks (WA), Swan Island 
(Vic.), Garden Island (East) Defence Precinct 
(NSW), Larrakeyah Barracks (NT) and Garden 
Island (WA, HMAS Stirling), all have a range 
of vulnerabilities. For the RAN, HMAS Cairns 
and HMAS Stirling will probably be the most 
affected sites.
Vulnerabilities include degradation of Defence 
buildings, roads, environmental assets, 
heritage sites, marine infrastructure and 
airstrips through inundation, coastal erosion 
or direct wave action. Drainage design is 
based on the relative heights of the drained 
area and the sea level beyond. As a result 
of sea-level rise, wharves will become more 
prone to damage from waves. New wharves 
will need to be built to a higher deck height to 
build resilience.
Energy efficiency
Given the long lifespan of estate operations, 
and because Defence is one of the largest 
construction customers in Australia, 
Defence Support Group should ensure that 
it incorporates energy-efficient designs, 
material and equipment when planning, 
constructing and renovating current and 
next-generation Defence facilities. Minimum 
standards on building energy efficiency 
should be reviewed regularly to ensure 
that practice keeps pace with advances 
in technology.
Responding to climate change may see the 
ADF under greater pressure to moderate its 
consumption of energy, reduce its impact 
on the environment and continue to lead 
best-practice standards. Defence consumes 
70% of the Australian Government’s energy 
use (55% in fuel, 15% in estate). Promoting 
energy efficiency should be seen as a positive 
to both save money and promote Defence as 
a responsible stakeholder.
The good news is that Defence participates 
actively in the government agenda on climate 
change through initiatives in place under the 
Energy Efficiency in Government Operations 
policy and the Australian Packaging Covenant. 
Innovations across the estate have involved 
the use of solar energy, and more recently 
wave energy at HMAS Stirling in Western 
Australia (see box 6).
As pressure from government and the 
community increases, Defence will be 
required to reduce its energy consumption 
and meet GHG emissions targets. While 
the ADF appears committed to meeting 
the government’s policy direction to have 
a corporate environmental management 
scheme, the Environmental Strategic 
Plan 2010–2014 gives climate change only 
cursory consideration.
The carbon price may encourage Defence 
to invest in alternative energy sources, 
such as the Garden Island scheme in 
Western Australia (see box 6).
Targeted energy savings can come from 
Defence establishments (from energy used 
in buildings and facilities) or operational fuel 
(from energy used by aircraft, tanks, ships, 
submarines and other vehicles).
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Box 6: Wave energy to be harnessed at Navy base
For all its energy and water, HMAS Stirling 
currently relies on services delivered over a 
4-kilometre causeway linking Garden Island 
with the mainland. The link is a single point 
of potential failure and is vulnerable to a 
range of potential threats, including ageing 
infrastructure and damage from natural 
events. Western Australian population 
growth and changing climatic conditions 
also place Garden Island under increased 
competition for resources.
Alternative energy and water sources benefit 
Defence strategically by reducing these 
vulnerabilities. One example at HMAS Stirling 
will exploit the power of ocean waves to 
provide the base with electricity and water.
Carnegie Wave Energy Limited is developing 
its own ‘CETO’ wave energy technology. 
Named after a Greek sea goddess, CETO 
will be able to produce near zero-emissions 
power and desalinated water from its fully 
submerged wave power converters. The 
converters produce high-pressure water from 
the waves and deliver it to an onshore turbine 
that generates electricity. The electricity can 
be fed into the base’s power grid or used 
directly to produce fresh water by reverse 
osmosis desalination.
CETO converter units are fully submerged 
and permanently anchored to the sea 
floor, avoiding visual impact on the 
environment and keeping them safe from 
storms. Manufactured from steel and other 
high-grade materials, they will provide over 
20 years’ service in the marine environment 
and be able to operate under a wide range of 
wave heights and directions.
In March 2012, Defence entered into licence 
negotiations with Carnegie Wave Energy 
to allow the construction of a wave energy 
demonstration plant on Garden Island. The 
Prime Minister announced the signing of 
the licence in July 2012, and construction will 
begin in early 2013.
On commissioning in early 2014, the 
Carnegie plant will provide up to 
1.25 megawatts of renewable energy to 
HMAS Stirling for a contracted period of 
five years.
Box 7: The ADF and the carbon price
In July 2012, the Australian Government 
introduced a regime to place a price on 
carbon. In the scheme’s initial phase, major 
polluters will be charged $23 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide equivalent released into the 
atmosphere. Based on Treasury modelling, 
it’s estimated that the carbon price will cost 
Defence $81.9 million in 2012–13.
While Defence isn’t a liable entity under the 
carbon pricing mechanism (it’s only required 
to pay the carbon price in the same way 
as other consumers), factoring the cost of 
carbon into procurement and planning will 
become essential.
Defence establishments are responsible for 
about 15% of total Australian Government 
energy use, which equates to 26% of 
government GHG emissions.
Defence bases offer an ideal testbed to 
develop and deploy the next generation 
of energy technologies to power built 
infrastructure. The advantages of Defence 
sites include their various sizes, forms, 
availability, locations (some suitable for wave, 
tidal, wind, geothermal or solar facilities), 
predictable loads and guaranteed returns 
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due to their operational longevity and low 
commercial risk.
Renewables
A strategic roadmap to have all Defence 
bases at zero GHG emissions by 2030 might 
help establish a market and assist the private 
sector’s transition by developing technologies 
from research to commercial stages. The 
DSTO should have key role in this process.
The benefits of such a move may include 
better security for Defence bases by 
enabling independence from the grid. As 
the grid becomes progressively networked, 
cyberthreats to the grid increase. 
Micro-renewable plants to power domestic 
Defence bases may help bring about advances 
in deployable versions.
The US Department of Defense will account 
for 15% of the microgrid market in 2013, 
and military implementation of microgrids 
will grow by 375% to US$1.6 billion annually 
by 2020.29
Moving to renewables and improving energy 
efficiency for static installations will be an 
important step towards reducing the number 
of convoys along dangerous routes.
Removing military bases from the grid 
and powering them with renewable 
technologies is already occurring in the US. 
The 12,000-person Nellis Air Force Base in 
southern Nevada, for example, has installed 
a 14.2 megawatt solar power plant to meet a 
quarter of its power requirements. The base 
now makes US$1 million a year in electricity 
savings and reduces its GHG emissions by 
22,000 tons.30
Independent power sources, such as solar 
power, can, if combined with storage or 
backup generation, eliminate the ADF’s 
reliance on domestic power grids, which 
may assist operational autonomy and 
overall capability.
These programs are not designed to 
place Defence as a quasi-state-owned 
R&D enterprise attempting to deliver 
unsustainable bespoke solutions. Rather, 
Defence will need to focus on proven 
‘bottom-up’ commercial-off-the-shelf 
technologies for gradual through-life 
capability upgrades to defence installations. 
It will also need to recognise whole-of-life 
energy costs in capability planning and form 
prudent partnerships with industry, which 
may help Australian companies in emerging 
renewables markets.
Reducing operational fuel use is a more 
contentious and challenging area for potential 
energy savings. Defence operational fuels are 
responsible for about 55% of the Australian 
Government’s energy use and around 31% of 
its GHG emissions. Fuels, oils and lubricants 
cost the ADF around $420 million each year.
While operational platforms for the near 
and medium term will be powered by 
traditional liquid fuels, there’ll be an emerging 
requirement to transition mobile platforms to 
alternative energy sources. The greatest scope 
for change is in platforms where endurance 
and persistence have priority, such as drones 
used for intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions. Being able to use 
locally produced biofuels relieves pressures 
on imported fuels that have significant price 
volatility and supply risks.
Supply chain security
The ADF Posture Review found that fuel 
supply is a ‘critical factor in the sustainability 
of our force posture.’31 While the current fuel 
supply chain meets operational demands, the 
review noted two areas of concern. First, if the 
global fuel supply chain were to come under 
major stress, Australia’s domestic refining 
capacity wouldn’t be able to meet the ADF’s 
fuel demands.
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Second, it’s uncertain what the stress of major 
Defence operations may do to the resilience 
of the current fuel supply chain. Finding 
alternatives to decrease the ADF’s reliance 
on external supplies in times of international 
crisis that may make supplies of crude difficult 
to obtain, or even unavailable, will increase 
operational resilience.
Interoperability
Apart from reducing GHG emissions and 
increasing operational resilience, one of 
the major aims will be to ensure that ADF 
platforms maintain fuel interoperability with 
allied forces, particularly the US military.
In 2011, the Secretary of the USN announced 
a series of energy targets, including a goal to 
have the USN derive half of its total energy 
consumption (ashore and afloat) from 
alternative energy sources. To underscore this 
commitment, in 2016 the USN is aiming to sail 
the ‘Great Green Fleet’, a carrier strike group 
powered by a mix of nuclear, hybrid electric 
and biofuel technology.
The RAN and USN recently signed a 
statement of cooperation to explore the 
use of alternative, environmentally friendly 
fuels. This agreement will enable the RAN 
to continue to work with the USN in joint 
operations, achieving the goal of a Great 
Green Fleet joint deployment in 2016. The 
RAAF may also need to consider such an 
option as the US Air Force examines biofuels.
Any move by either the RAN or the RAAF to 
alternative fuels will depend on those fuels 
being relatively price competitive.
Alternative fuels need to meet rigorous safety 
and performance standards. For example, 
ethanol has a lower energy density than 
conventional jet fuel. More of it is needed to 
reach higher altitudes, so jets may need to 
carry more fuel during operations.
Investing in adaptive wing technology and 
alternative propulsion technologies could 
increase the Air Force’s capabilities and energy 
efficiency. New wing technology for subsonic 
Box 8: US and Canadian initiatives
In Canada, the CF-18 and CC-130 have 
been certified to use US-produced biofuel 
blends. During their modification, the 
Halifax class frigates are being fitted 
with stern flaps and improved antifouling 
paint to improve both fuel economy and 
hydrodynamic performance.
The US Army is developing an electric vehicle 
fleet in order to reduce its reliance on fuel on 
the battlefield.
The US Department of Defense is 
increasingly turning to microgrids to ensure 
self-contained energy generation and 
assuredness during critical operations. 
There are 454 renewable energy initiatives 
currently underway or under development by 
the department.
The development of more efficient and 
longer lasting batteries and fuel cells to 
provide portable power systems for troops is 
a US defence priority.
In 2010, the US Air Force conducted the first 
successful test flight of an aircraft powered 
by a biofuel blend. It aims to use alternative 
fuels for 50% of its domestic needs by 2016.
Increased use of alternative fuels in US 
tactical fleets and systems is an important 
consideration for ADF capability planners 
seeking fuel interoperability between 
national platforms. The costs of biofuels are 
declining as production increases.
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commercial aircraft has the potential to cut 
drag, offering a 30% saving on fuel.32
Energy culture
There’ll be a need to shift away from an 
‘energy intensive’ culture within Defence. 
Although there have been several initiatives 
aimed at increasing awareness to save energy, 
there remains a strong culture within Defence 
that suggests it should be exempt from 
such measures.
Fuel efficiency standards could be tougher 
and included as a priority in Defence Materiel 
Organisation / Capability Development 
Group capability requirements. For example, 
Defence should purchase hybrid trucks. 
One encouraging development is the ADF’s 
partnership with the Australian National 
University and the Centre for Sustainable 
Energy Systems to develop lightweight solar 
power panels to be worn by infantry soldiers 
to power essential equipment.
The ADF should be seen as a proactive 
employer delivering best practice. 
Reducing emissions and having sustainable 
procurement should be part of this package. 
This requires greater emphasis in the ADF on 
reducing reliance on fossil fuels; reducing GHG 
emissions; increasing energy efficiency and 
accountability; investing in renewable energy 
resources; investing in green design and 
construction; and promoting environmental 
conservation. On renewables, Defence 
should be a ‘fast follower’ and an ‘acquisition 
enabler’, not necessarily a driver of the 
renewables investment market.
And having a good story to tell on energy 
sustainability will have a positive impact 
on defence force recruitment: Gen Y are 
Defence’s target group and the environment 
is one of their top concerns.
Personnel and training
Training and preparing Defence personnel 
to operate in changing and more extreme 
environments will become increasingly 
important as climate change affects the 
Asia–Pacific region.
Operating environments
Increases in regional temperatures, flooding, 
desertification and storm intensity mean 
that Defence personnel could be operating 
in radically different environments. While 
it’s true that the ADF has been operating 
in Afghanistan in extreme heat and cold, 
extreme conditions will occur more often, 
which may reduce its ability to carry out 
its missions.
The training conditions of personnel will 
need to reflect the change in operating 
environments. All three services of the 
ADF have a large presence in the north of 
Australia (most ADF personnel are currently 
based in and around Darwin). The tropical 
climate acclimatises personnel to the 
conditions they’ll face in the Asia–Pacific 
region. However, as tropical and monsoonal 
conditions worsen in the region, our forces 
will face more extreme conditions and be 
placed under greater operating stress. Rising 
temperatures and prolonged heatwaves 
will place greater heat stress on personnel, 
affecting their ability to train, as well as to 
maintain and operate military capabilities, in 
tougher environmental conditions.
Many activities at sea are sea-state limited, 
so higher wave heights and wind speeds 
may affect naval training and operations 
more seriously than now. Their impacts on 
helicopter operations, small boat operations 
and ship berthing will need to be considered 
in military planning.
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Simulation
Maximising the use of simulator training 
will allow flexibility in preparing for different 
environments, and may also reduce the 
ADF’s impact on the natural environment 
by reducing GHG emissions, energy use and 
damage to ecosystems. However, an increase 
in simulator training may have unknown 
flow-on effects on operational capability.
Increasing the resilience of personnel to 
changes in future operating environments will 
involve including climate change and disaster 
management scenarios in training and theatre 
campaigns.
Preparedness
Changes to operating environments will 
test the resilience and endurance of ADF 
personnel, who may face more frequent 
deployments to disaster-prone regions, 
leaving reserves for domestic disaster relief 
efforts. The demand on the ADF’s human 
capabilities may stretch forces beyond 
optimal performance ranges.
Skill sets
A change in the ADF’s role and missions will 
have consequences for the skills needed by 
its personnel. Dual combat and humanitarian 
roles may mean that emphasis will be placed 
on recruiting, training and keeping personnel 
with skills specific to different combat or  
HA/DR roles.
Mitigating and adapting to the effects of 
climate change will require an increase in 
Defence personnel who specialise in disaster 
management, infrastructure resilience and 
other logistical areas. A greater demand 
for those skills and types of expertise may 
need to be matched by a shift in command 
structures to avoid the ‘stovepiping’ of 
knowledge and skills.
Defence will need to develop closer working 
relationships with climate science agencies 
such as CSIRO and the Bureau of Meteorology, 
so that scientific developments and climate 
projections are more fully integrated 
into the ADF’s policies and planning for 
climate change.
Strengthening DSTO, Bureau of Meteorology 
and CSIRO links would help Defence obtain 
specific climate change information. The 
organisation should explore opportunities 
to work with other agencies to contribute 
to implementing the government’s Plan for 
Implementing Climate Change Science in 
Australia.33
Health risks
Defence personnel operating within the 
region will face increasing health challenges. 
Allergic complaints and respiratory problems, 
such as hay fever and asthma, are expected 
to proliferate due to changes in airborne 
pollutants.34
A changing climate will have implications for 
the geographical distribution of infectious 
diseases. Rising temperatures will bring an 
increase in diseases such as gastroenteritis 
and affect the range and abundance of insect 
vectors and the size of animal reservoirs, 
changing the seasonality and length of 
transmission cycles.
Many microorganisms multiply more rapidly 
in hotter and more humid conditions. The rate 
and distribution of mosquito-borne diseases, 
such as malaria and dengue fever, will be 
affected by changing rainfall patterns and a 
rise in humidity and temperature. A changing 
climate will change the movements of 
disease-carrying animals and the transmission 
of disease by air, food, water or vector 
organisms, particularly to populations that 
lack acquired immunity.
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The increased risk of infectious disease has 
several implications for the ADF. An outbreak 
of pandemic disease could contribute to 
an increase in HA/DR missions. Defence 
personnel may need to cooperate more with 
AusAID and other bodies active in the region’s 
health to improve the surge capacity of 
regional emergency health sectors.
Temperature increases and prolonged 
heatwaves will exacerbate the effects of 
heat stress on exposed populations, including 
Defence personnel. Heart attacks, strokes, 
respiratory failure, dehydration, organ 
failure and fatigue, as well as an increase 
in risk-prone behaviour, can all result from 
heat stress.
Defence personnel will face a change in 
health preparedness, requiring vaccinations, 
greater acclimatisation to altered or extreme 
operating conditions, and possibly increased 
medical training.
The new impacts on health and an increased 
risk of disease may reduce the ADF’s 
recruitment pool through either an adverse 
perception of risk or an increase in physical 
entry requirements.
Policy recommendations
Climate change will have multiple impacts on 
the ADF’s operating environment, not least 
in the physical battlespace. Climate science 
involves no more uncertainty than other 
environmental factors in Defence planning.
The Australian Government should look for 
opportunities to integrate climate change 
responses into Defence research, planning 
and development.
The ADF requires a relatively long lead time 
to be able to integrate new strategies and 
capabilities into its planning, policies and 
operations. It will require decision support 
from climate science agencies on the impact 
of climate change and how best to respond to 
the risks.
Defence will need to factor climate change 
in to its long-term recapitalisation process 
and through-life approach to capability 
requirements in the way that the UK’s 
Ministry of Defence has started to do (see 
box 9).
The following actions should be the basis for 
Defence’s adaptation to climate change.
Leadership and communication
 • Establish an interagency working group
Defence should work with the 
Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and the Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency to establish 
an interagency working group on climate 
change and security. The group should 
include AusAID, the DSTO, the Bureau of 
Meteorology and CSIRO. It would focus 
on addressing climate event scenarios for 
Australia and the Asia–Pacific region in 
order to manage the risks those scenarios 
pose to national resilience and regional 
stability. The Defence Environmental 
Managers Forum might provide 
secretariat services.
 • Appoint a climate adviser
The Navy’s Hydrography, Meteorology and 
Oceanography Branch has links with the 
Bureau of Meteorology. Defence should 
appoint the branch’s director-general as 
the adviser to the Chief of the Defence 
Force (CDF) on climate issues. A DSTO 
officer could be the deputy. The CDF’s 
climate adviser should run a process 
covering all groups and services (but 
critically Strategy and the Chief Finance 
Officer Group) to identify the implications 
of the existing science for Defence. 
The climate adviser should develop a 
Responding to Climate Change Plan, that 
details how Defence will manage the 
effects of climate change on its operations 
and infrastructure.
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Box 9: The UK’s Ministry of Defence
In its Climate Change Delivery Plan, the UK’s 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) establishes its 
climate change vision: ‘effective delivery of 
Defence capability that is robust to climate 
change and does not substantially contribute 
to its causes’.
The MoD sets out two objectives to achieve 
this vision:
 • mitigation, to ‘continually reduce the 
Greenhouse Gases that result from 
Defence activities, such that Defence will 
eventually not be a significant contributor 
to the causes of climate change’
 • adaptation, to ensure that it has the 
‘capacity to operate in a changing climate 
such that Defence capability is not 
compromised and any potential benefits 
from the future climate are realised’.
To achieve these objectives, the MoD has 
developed a comprehensive plan to meet a 
carbon budget by understanding operational 
energy use and reducing emissions and the 
energy used by its estate and activities.
The MoD has also outlined comprehensive 
policy and capability planning to adapt its 
forces and estate and to adopt sustainable 
procurement principles.
Planning
 • Study data collection and monitoring
Defence should audit its environmental 
data to determine its relevance for climate 
scientists and systematically make that 
data publicly available. 
Because of the geographic spread of its 
estate, Defence should determine if there 
are areas where extra data collection 
would be relevant to understanding 
climate change. The climate adviser should 
lead in this work.
 • Establish public–private partnerships
The government should establish  
public–private partnerships between 
Defence, industry and the research 
community to develop innovative 
solutions in areas related to energy 
efficiency and climate change adaptation.
 • Share best international practice
At the international level, Australia should 
work with like-minded countries in the 
‘Five Eyes’ community to share best 
practice and thinking on how military 
organisations should best respond to 
extreme weather events.
Sustainability
 • Set up a green team
Defence should establish a small ‘green 
team’ to work across the organisation to 
see where further energy efficiencies can 
be achieved.
 • Study incentives
A study is needed to examine incentives 
to encourage the three services to invest 
in renewable resource programs. The 
study could be part of a system-wide 
whole-of-Defence study, such as Defence’s 
environmental baselining studies of the 
Defence estate.
Research
 • Engage with climate scientists
The organisation should facilitate better 
engagement with climate scientists 
through seminars, workshops and focus 
groups on specific issues, such as sea-level 
rise impacts on ports, increased bushfire, 
flood and storm risks to Defence bases, 
and changes in sea states as a result of 
climate change.
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 • Bring climate scientists into the 
organisation
Defence should establish postdoctoral 
fellowships for climate scientists to work 
within the organisation to facilitate 
information exchange. The Australian 
Defence Force Academy and our military 
staff colleges could host them.
Costings
While the recommendations outlined here 
will incur some additional costs, those costs 
should be capped at $2 million annually. 
Savings through better energy cost controls 
would be far greater than the cost of 
implementing the recommendations in this 
report, the bulk of which relate to greater 
coordination and integration of climate issues 
across Defence.
Concluding remarks
As the world becomes more networked, the 
impacts of climate change in one country or 
region will affect the prosperity and security 
of others around the world.
Those impacts may be as a result of direct 
physical changes in Australia, but more often 
will be second- or third-order consequences of 
changes in other countries.
The 2013 Defence White Paper should 
clearly articulate the implications of climate 
change for the ADF, which go beyond merely 
meeting government GHG emissions targets. 
Indeed, the introduction of a Defence energy 
strategy is about improving operational 
effectiveness while reducing risk and future 
costs. Reductions in GHG emissions are an 
important benefit, but a secondary one.
Climate change will require Defence to 
play its part not in isolation but as part of 
a whole-of-government approach, from 
identifying the threat and taking preventive 
action to reduce the risk, through to dealing 
with the consequences.
Having a senior ADF officer, backed by a 
competent and knowledgeable staff, with 
responsibility for climate change matters will 
send the right message about the degree to 
which the ADF is responding to climate risks.
The ADF will always need to have hard-edged 
war-fighting capabilities, but it will also have 
to recognise the increasing requirement 
to become involved in capacity building, 
especially in those countries that are already 
feeling the effect of stresses and where 
climate change will have its greatest impact.
This isn’t about the military having a ‘green’ 
view of the world: it’s about the ADF being 
well placed to deal with the potential 
disruptive forces of climate change.
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